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Introduction 
The world has consistently witnessed the rise and fall of dynasties or empires in the 
history of humanity through countless warfare. The 20
th
 century was no exception 
either and the advance of technology has only accelerated the process in which 
countries can rise or fall from power. While the developed nations in Europe, North 
America and Asia have largely entered a period of relative peace, the nature of power 
dynamic between states is no longer characterised solely by their military capability 
but also their level of economic prosperity (Nye, 1990a). Trade balance, financial 
market, national economic growth have all taken a new determining role in the state’s 
global influence as the global market becomes increasingly integrated (Oksenberg and 
Economy, 1999, p10).  
The seemingly changing nature of power towards more economic based forms of 
primacy is a main theme in this project as I’d like to demonstrate that a state can 
achieve a stronger global influence by having a sizeable national economy. This is a 
recurring theme in the work of some scholars such as Streeck, Freidman, Oksenberg 
and Economy, Cerny, Genshel and Seelkopf, which will be looked at later. The key 
debate here is to see the extent a major global actor such as European Union (EU) 
would compromise on its ideology for economic interest and on this basis, evaluate its 
changing power relations vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China (hereafter PRC). 
PRC as a rapidly developing country is entering the global political landscape swiftly 
after a series of economic reforms in the 1980s. A rapid economic growth rate allowed 
PRC to catch-up economically to now having the second largest Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in the world, which grants the state an increasingly decisive role in the 
global economy as well as – I will argue – in the global development of ideology.  
On the other hand we have the European Union (EU), whose member states consist of 
some of the largest imperialist powers in history, having colonised and controlled the 
majority of the world in the past. Having relinquished most of their colonies and 
endured the two world wars, the founding of EU aimed at uniting Europe in the face 
4 
 
of other larger powers such as USA and the Soviet Union. The union also facilitated a 
speedy recovery to the national economy of the European powers after the wars and a 
consolidation of the European liberalism value.  
The European liberal values including democracy, human rights and a market 
economy derived from neoliberal economics were later spread particularly eastwards 
to the former Soviet states in the Balkans and South Caucasus as they are the 
prerequisites for the accession to EU (Anastasakis, 2005; European Commission). 
Nevertheless, the promotion of the EU liberalism around the world has been criticised 
as an uneven process or at times contradicting. This is reflected in its relations with 
authoritarian state and an increasingly pragmatist approach in its foreign relations 
especially in the refugee crisis (Gresh, 2016; Alfred, 2016)  
The same could be said for the Sino-EU relations and hence it’s the main case-study 
of my research. Since they established formal diplomatic relations in 1975, EU has 
attempted to exert the same liberal values on PRC. The Chinese economy is now 
more integrated in the global economy than before, becoming the second largest 
trading partner of the EU and EU being the largest trading partner of PRC (European 
Union, 2016). Nevertheless, the illiberal nature of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) remains to be evident throughout recent years especially in terms of violation 
of human rights. The hope of progress further diminished as the EU found itself in the 
midst of the sovereign debt crisis and economic stagnation, losing much of the 
bargaining leverage against a booming Chinese economy.  
Extensive trade partnership inevitably creates an interdependent relation, yet if one 
side suddenly is more dependent than the other in this relation, the asymmetry could 
be a source of power for the other (Nye, 1990a). In this case, not only does the EU 
lose its ability to exert influence on the CPC in adopting a more liberal policy, but its 
legitimacy is potentially undermined too as the EU pursues closer economic ties with 
PRC despite ongoing human rights abuse that goes against the value, upon which the 
EU was founded. Against this backdrop, this paper investigates the impacts of PRC’s 
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growing economic power on the European Union’s increasingly vulnerable liberal 
agenda. 
This research aims to investigate to what extent an integrated globalised economy that 
is increasingly tilted towards the PRC, impacts the ability of EU to advocate and 
safeguard their fundamental liberal values in a competitive economic environment 
and in the broader context of power struggle. The first section of the paper is divided 
as follows: this paper will first review relevant literature to conceptualise the notion of 
liberalism in EU and its criticism. I will then move on to the transformation of politics, 
power in the globalised age of an economic primacy world and look at the emergence 
of competition state and a new influential market force. This is followed by the 
challenge of a rising authoritarian PRC and its implication on the European liberalism. 
Finally, I will look at the power dynamics between EU and China based on their 
interaction in the context of trade, values and particularly human rights. In the second 
and third section, the paper will introduce the two sub case studies of France and 
Germany, looking at their respective bilateral relations with PRC though literature as 
well as discourse analysis. 
Methodology 
For this research, the Sino-German and Sino-French relations are my chosen 
between-case studies. As the founding member states of the European Economic 
Community in 1957, which later led to the establishment of the EU in 1993, they are 
the two member states that, not only represent the core European values with full 
integration in the EU (including monetary union unlike United Kingdom), but also the 
largest economic weight of all. Not to mention that the relations of both states 
vis-à-vis China are more strategic than others due to their significant influence in 
other international institutions such as the G20 forum and the United Nation Security 
Council (UNSC).  
For this paper, discourse analysis will be implemented in additional to qualitative 
research of secondary resources. The discourse analysis will be based mainly on the 
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official public communication from the President of France and the Chancellor of 
Germany respectively on their stance and attitude towards the bilateral relations with 
China between the periods of January, 2010 till December, 2016.  
All public communications specifically commenting on the bilateral relations of the 
two countries with PRC have initially been selected. However, due to an unequal 
volume of available material between the two case-studies, I had to eliminate some 
German materials to make a fair comparison. The further selection criteria for the 
German materials are done on the basis of content quality, length and relevance to the 
topic. The analysis aims first to see the frequency and thus importance of the topic 
mentioned and to second, see the manner and attitude in which the relevant topic is 
portrayed by the state leaders. From this analysis, I hope to confirm the perceived 
significance of economic interest comparative to ideology or values and evaluate their 
degree of limitation and determination in pursuing the liberal agenda with PRC.  
Due to the diverse nature of the European Union and also the fact that each state 
maintains their individual relation with PRC in addition to the one represented by the 
EU collectively, it would be out of the scope for this research to do a full coverage of 
all 28 member states. For this reason, the overall review of EU’s stance against PRC 
in the first section will aim to compensate for this shortcoming by demonstrating the 
internal conflicts between the member states within the EU vis-à-vis PRC. 
The EU’s Liberal Agenda 
Article F of the Amsterdam Treaty sums up the core liberal values of the EU: “The 
[European]Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms…” (European Parliament, 1997, p8). 
Liberalism is a political theory with origin from the Age of Enlightenment in the 17
th
 
century, whose definition has been widely debated. It has been generally agreed that it 
constitutes the principles of equality and fundamental human rights to religion, speech, 
politics, property etc (Kirchner, 2009, p2). Men argued that the rise of liberalism in 
Europe was because governments were hoping to respect and compensate the 
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individual way of life of all Europeans after the hardship of the two world wars (2011, 
p537).  
The right to property also gave way to capitalist neoliberal economics, believing in 
reaching maximum economic outcomes in trade with minimal intervention from the 
government through deregulation, privatisation, free trade and free market (Berman, 
2009, p562; Friedman, 2005). In other words, the market force based on supply and 
demand is more efficient than a centrally planned economy for best economic 
outcome. This concept of market economy is also part of the Washington Consensus 
that has been advocated to the world by international institutions like the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (Rodrik, 2011, p77).  
However, complete market economy free from government intervention doesn’t exist 
due to numerous limitations. Cerny argues that the boundary between state and 
market is very blurred nowadays as states also increasingly become a market actor 
themselves in a complex intertwined economic structure (1997, p267). Wallerstein 
claims that a perfect market would contradict capitalism as perfect information would 
allow buyer to bargain down to the minimum level of profit for the seller (2004). 
Polanyi says that “even laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate state 
action” and the role of government is thus important to maintain the market (Block 
and Somers, 2014, p106). Furthermore, the governments may have other goals than 
just reaching maximum economic outcomes, including concerns related to social 
security, health and safety etc. Therefore, even the EU’s model is said to be largely 
market economy with some blend of government interferences in order to ensure 
market stability and protect national interest.  
Not only has EU upheld the liberal values at home, they have also made effort to 
project these values into the world because the EU model “based on the principles of 
democracy, freedom and solidarity… works”, as quoted from a former EU executive 
(Prodi, 2000). This is supported by official statements where the EU legitimised 
intervention in third countries on the basis of human right (European Commission, 
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1995, p10) and their foreign policy to curtail relations with “governments engaged in 
violations of human rights and democracy standards” or even impose sanctions and 
apply other possible measures if necessary (Kuijper et al., 2013, p712). For this 
reason, a human right clause is present in all EU cooperation agreements since the 
1990s to grant the EU rights to punish the partner in cooperation in case of 
encroachment on the human rights value (Men, 2011). As for the market economy 
model, it is a key condition to gain accession to the EU, thus opening up the markets 
of aspired EU neighbours. Men considers it as a “new interventionism” by the EU to 
instate these liberal values as universal through their global influence and compel 
third countries to adopt their values if they wish to improve their ties with the EU 
(Ibid.).  
Liberalism in human rights and trade therefore represents a core component of EU’s 
identity and it has been legitimised to a great extent to become a more globally 
accepted value through their past efforts. Nevertheless, EU has been criticised for 
hypocrisy as a closer examination of EU’s foreign relations would reveal 
contradiction to these EU values. For example, EU has long held amicable relations 
with authoritarian governments such as Tunisia, Egypt before the Arab Spring in the 
name of combating terrorism (Gresh, 2016). In the face of rising nationalism in the 
EU, a recent proposal to offer financial assistance to some African states including the 
repressive dictatorships in Sudan and Eritrea in hopes of stemming the migration flow 
also drew heavy criticism. It goes against the 1951 Refugee Convention signed in 
Geneva and the EU’s claim to safeguard human rights when EU makes conscious 
effort to keep the refugees in oppressive states with poor human rights, especially if 
the dictators will benefit financially from this cooperation with EU (Alfred, 2016). 
The rapid development of Chinese exports is also largely due to developed countries 
like EU turning a blind eye to underpaid labours working in appalling conditions in 
PRC, which only helped firms from developed countries improve their profit margin 
at the expense of the Chinese labours (Kernaghan , 2009). 
From this perspective, it can be said that EU’s foreign relations is increasingly 
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characterised by pragmatism over ideology. Since EU was confronted by economic 
stagnation, the rise of nationalism due to the financial crisis in 2008, this arguably 
becomes even more evident in its foreign policy and especially in its approach for 
PRC in order to favour its economic interest. In brief, the political and economic crisis 
at home is affecting its ability to keep pursuing its liberal agenda.  
Globalisation and Transformation of the State 
To see how the EU ended up in the current crisis, it must be traced back to how their 
economy became increasingly integrated in the so-called globalisation phenomenon. 
The concept of globalisation is not easily defined as it encompasses a wide range of 
areas and there is a large debate about this concept. McGrew defined globalisation as 
a multidimensional process of intensifying worldwide integration (2007, p280). In the 
economic field, the general perception of globalisation is facilitated by growing 
market liberalisation and neoliberal economics principles, leading to a greater extent 
of interconnectedness between states and the gradual emergence of a singular 
operative system for the world economy (Ibid.). Reducing cost of transportation, 
communication due to technology advancement and the spread of neoliberal ideology 
have largely facilitated globalisation (Frankel, 2000, p2; Rodrik, 2011, p25). This also 
largely transformed the global political landscape. 
National politics are no longer determined solely by the domestic environment but 
influenced largely by external elements from multilayered institutional settings 
beyond the sovereignty of the state (Cerny, 1997, p253). Looking at global trade alone, 
export has taken a significantly higher proportion of the world output than before, 
which highlights the heightened integration between states today (McGrew, 2007, 
p283). The 20
th
 century saw the growing influence of supranational/ international 
institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and market force, driven by 
what Friedman calls the “Electronic Herd”, comprised of “faceless stock, bond and 
currency trader… [and] big multinational corporations” who can move their capitals 
around the world instantly thanks to modern day technology and more relaxed capital 
control as a result of neoliberal principles (1999, p90).  
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Globalisation has therefore imposed an external restrain on the extent of autonomy 
that a state can dictate its own politics if it wants to be included in the process (Cerny, 
1997, p.257; Oksenberg & Economy, 1999, p20). Rodrik points out that it ultimately 
clashes with democracy since states’ policies have to prioritise the commercial and 
financial interests of the electronic herds over the social objectives for their people 
(2011, p206). Streeck agrees in claiming that heavily indebted countries like Greece is 
basically stripped of democracy in order to appeal to the market force for investment 
at the expense of social welfare for the nation (2011, p26). In other words, national 
interests and democracy come into conflict with the deeper integration with the global 
standards and therefore the state must effectively accept the global rules over 
domestic needs (Rodrik, p83; Buruael, 2013, p4).  
This leads us to Friedman’s concept of “Golden Straitjacket” that a state must wear in 
the age of globalisation dominated by neoliberal principles (1999, p87). This implies a 
greater extent of marketisation of national economy to convert the state into the ideal 
environment for investments but at the same time accept greater extent of external 
constraints on the available domestic policy choices. Friedman believes that “the 
tighter you wear it, the more gold it produces” and the quicker your economy grows 
(Ibid.). In Rodrik’s opinion, Friedman is right in pointing out the underlying conflict 
between hyperglobalisation and domestic politics but its ability to generate wealth is 
overestimated as proven by the Argentinean crisis in the late 1990s, which only made 
the country even more vulnerable to external economic shocks (2011, p189).  
Rodrik went on to propose the political trilemma model as shown in figure 1. Other 
than the “Golden Straitjacket” approach, the third component of domestic policy is 
included to visualise the incompatibility between the two and what the other two 
options are if a state wishes to keep the democratic policy component. “Global 
federalism” implicates a declining role of nation state to give place to a global 
democracy system, which the author views with scepticism as it seems too idealistic 
and not foreseeable in the current global climate. The “Bretton Woods compromise” is 
a step back from hyperglobalisation where nation states impose a more protectionist 
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approach, against the neoliberal principles, to give way for a more moderate 
globalisation and more space for the government to meet domestic needs rather than 
render itself entirely to the global rules (Ibid., p69; Burauel, 2013, p4).  
 
Figure 1 The political Trilemma of the World Economy. Pick two, any two (Rodrik, 2011, p201) 
From the perspective of this model, countries who pursue neoliberal principles must 
necessarily give up democratic politics to an extent since the market economy aims to 
serve mainly the interest of businesses and multinational corporations instead of the 
domestic needs of the people. The cause for the rise of nationalism and xenophobia 
nowadays in Europe has been partly blamed on the inability of countries in golden 
straitjackets to protect and stand for the interest of their nation (Cerny, 1997, p255; 
Berman 2009, p573). The traditional mainstream parties can’t protect the interest of 
the people against the deterioration of social mobility, equality, welfare anymore. 
Even though the underlying problem is an unregulated global marketisation that 
allows rapid wealth accumulation for the plutocrats, the people turn to xenophobic 
radical right parties in hopes for a solution. Dubbed ‘descent into barbarism’, this 
ultimately also undermines liberal values in the heart of the European societies with a 
surging discrimination and racism (Gonzalez-Vicente and Carroll, 2017). Apart from 
this internal illiberal development as the people’s welfare reduces in the golden 
straitjacket, I argue that a “Golden Straitjacket” strapped EU also loses the capacity to 
pursue their liberal values externally because global rules now see the increasing 
omnipresence of PRC’s economic power, which directly challenges EU’s liberal 
agenda around the world (see below).  
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Competition State restrained by Electronic Herd?  
Another phenomenon in the age of globalisation was the transformation of 
traditionally welfare states into competition states (Cerny, 1997). While the golden 
straitjacket theory highlights the gradual disappearance of domestic democracy, the 
competition state theory explains the reason in greater depth. In brief, states are 
exposed to intense international competition in the era of globalisation and they face 
additional pressure to appeal to the market force; not just for fiscal stability but also 
prospective growth as demand for mass-produced goods is gradually saturated 
(Genshel and Seelkopf, 2015, p241; Streeck, 2011, p25). The increased mobility of 
capital obliges states to consider the policies of other competing states when adopting 
their taxation rate and wages to attract foreign businesses and investments (Friedman, 
1999, p89).  
The competition for mobile capital and economic growth therefore take the form of 
further privatisation of public services, implementation of business friendly policies 
such as low corporate tax rate, commoditisation of labour and marketisation of social 
relations with generally less welfare for the society, encroaching national democracy 
(Rodrik, 2011, p190; Genshel and Seelkopf, 2015, p238). Genshel and Seelkopf 
provided evidence of convergence on a lower corporate tax rate around the world and 
a tendency of shifting the burden onto labour taxation instead because capitals are far 
more mobile than labour (Ibid.). In the face of the financial crisis, governments were 
under pressure from the market to avoid another Great Depression and purchase the 
bad debt from failing banks in the wake of the global financial crisis and subsequently 
shifting the cost onto the nation through austerity measures. This is another example 
of states prioritising the domestic financial stability and business environment over 
the welfare of the citizens as a result of greater extent of marketisation (Ibid.; Streeck, 
2011, p23). 
While it is debatable whether those measures per se worked in favour of economy as 
it depends on other variables as well, they were all done in the pursuit of attracting 
foreign capitals and the electronic herds. In the economic primacy world, economic 
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power has become political power (Ibid.). According to Goldstein, those who become 
the core of the global economy attains the status of economic hegemony and the 
ability to dominate the field of international relations (1988, p281). Electronic herds 
are influential profit oriented actors who benefit the most from the emergence of 
competitive states in golden straitjackets (Friedman, 1999, p91). They often see 
political or human rights issues as a disturbance for their businesses (Cabestan, 2011, 
p88) and their increased involvement, interaction with the state through lobbying also 
helped encourage the competitive state and golden straitjacket approach (Cerny, 1997, 
p270). This is demonstrated by the fact that 20 business leaders of German firms 
accompanied Merkel’s visit to PRC in 2016 (Delfs, 2016). 
In short, globalisation under neoliberal principles has led states to pay greater 
attention to international trade and the electronic herds in order to boost economic 
growth. At the same time, that undermines their authority and ability to formulate 
domestic policies for the interests of the national democracy or else they’d face the 
adverse aftermaths of mass capital flight and downgrades of national bonds or credit 
rating while being strapped in this straitjacket (Streeck, 2011, p26). This demonstrates 
only partly the constraints from the market force but the opposing force from PRC 
also constitutes another obstacle for EU’s liberal agenda. 
The Rise of an Authoritarian Economic Powerhouse 
PRC has made huge progress since former statesman Xiaoping Deng implemented 
market reforms to open the country to world economy towards late 1970’s. The 
integration to global trade has only accelerated since PRC’s accession in the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001. PRC’s GDP in USD has more than six 
folded since 2001 to today and it also has the greatest number of middle-class as of 
2015 (Credit Suisse, 2015). The rise of middle-class in PRC made it the world’s 2nd 
consumer market as the population has higher purchasing power and higher demands 
for luxury goods (Wang and Ding, 2016; Sachwald, 2004, p254). A report by the 
European Parliament describes how PRC is considered as “THE strategic market” and 
the rise of PRC generated great opportunity for European businesses to boost revenue 
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(2011, p11). The domestic-driven growth helped insulate PRC from the world 
financial crisis as domestic aggregate demand compensated for the decline of foreign 
demands (Chin and Thakur, 2010). With the highest investment rate of any other G20 
countries, it significantly helped the Chinese firms in technology acquisition, which 
enables industries in PRC to increase their international competitiveness and move 
their exports up the value chain (Guo, 2016; Fox and Godement, 2009, p11).  
PRC has become a global power with significant economic might and also a growing 
tendency to provide stability and public goods to the global economy. This has been 
demonstrated in the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the European sovereign debt 
crisis in 2010 when PRC contributed significantly to alleviate the situation through 
continuous trade and investment. The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative with the 
aim of improving the infrastructure connection between PRC and Europe through the 
Eurasia continent and Africa is also supposed to have the objective of bring mutual 
benefits to both PRC and participating countries just like the win-win rhetoric often 
emphasised by President Jinping Xi (2016). Furthermore, 2015 and 2016 also saw the 
establishment of two multilateral development banks, the New Development Banks 
(NDB) involving the other BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa) and the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in both of which PRC has significant 
stake and financial contribution. 
However, some scholars would highlight the underlying pragmatism in these 
developments. According to Leverett and Wu, the OBOR project is part of PRC’s 
foreign policy of becoming more proactive and forward-looking, known as 
fenfayouwei (奮發有為), in order to promote greater regional influence and positive 
bilateral relations of PRC with the surrounding countries (2016, p130). It helps boost 
the status of PRC’s currency as well through the Chinese financed infrastructural 
projects and ultimately expand trade with the affluent EU though a well developed 
freight route (Ibid.; Godement, 2015, p2). The development projects will also help 
gather goodwill from benefitting developing countries, leading to a potential 
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balancing against the current global system dominated by the developed countries 
(Ibid., p7). As for the AIIB, it’s said to be part of PRC’s shadow foreign policy to 
forge an alternative parallel structure to the current order (Huotari et al., 2015, p34). 
The transatlantic alliance of EU and US already showed signs of conflict as Germany, 
France and the UK joined the AIIB despite opposition and criticism from US that 
AIIB does not have the sufficient standards in terms of governance and in 
environmental regards (Browne, 2015). Neither AIIB nor NDB promote liberal values 
like the World Bank does (Godement, Parello-Plesner and Richard, 2011, p15). Their 
establishment and participation by liberal states like Germany, France signify an 
increasingly less liberal oriented global order led by PRC and a gradually more 
accommodating approach by the supposedly liberal EU countries towards PRC for 
economic interest. 
These developments highlighted how the authoritarian state has gained much leverage 
in the world of globalised economy and also expanded their influence as PRC 
developed rapidly through becoming the world’s factory. A more prosperous PRC 
now becomes a significant part of the electronic herds with increasing outwards FDI 
to the world, foreign countries also face pressure to comply with PRC’s political 
expectation in order to maintain access to the strategic market. This is exemplified by 
pressure from Beijing for international community to not meet with political 
dissidents of the CPC. The meeting between former UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron and the spiritual leader of Tibet, Dalai Lama, in 2012 was said to have led to 
a loss of billions in Chinese investment for the UK and a study also supports this 
claim by stating an average decrease of 8.1% in exports to China in the two following 
years as a result (Fuchs and Klann, 2010). Cameron ultimately gave in to the pressure 
from Beijing in the end to agree not to meet the spiritual leader again in 2015 to 
resolve the tension.  
Furthermore, the case of AIIB is another example of how liberal values is undermined 
as the EU countries also take a more pragmatic approach to accommodate PRC even 
though the EU external policy law requires them to curtail relations with countries 
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who don’t respect human rights. The new economic power grants PRC much political 
capital to be more autonomous from political pressure from EU and more leverage to 
pursue own agenda. Ikenberry characterises PRC as a “part-time spoiler” instead of a 
full-scale revisionist, whose objective is not to challenge the global order directly, but 
rather slowly disrupt the liberal globalisation over time to insert their own ideational 
influence as their economic power grows (2014). This leads us to the question 
whether the ‘straitjacket’ of globalisation is increasingly designed by a rising 
authoritarian PRC? 
The challenges for EU in the tug of war with PRC 
To answer the question, we should first analyse the historical power relationship 
between the two global actors. According to Nye, “power is one’s ability to affect the 
behaviour of others to get what one wants”(2009). In light of this view, EU’s power 
vis-à-vis PRC has been rather limited. EU had hoped that the strategy of integrating 
PRC into the liberal world order, then dominated by developed liberal countries, 
would have forced PRC to modernise and adopt more liberal values in its natural 
course, as implicated by the golden straitjacket theory, and maintain the liberal 
unipolarity (Maher, 2016, p3; Kappel, 2011, p5). Friedman predicted that PRC either 
“won’t get richer or it won’t be as authoritarian” once it is entirely integrated into 
global economy (1999, p337). With these beliefs, the liberal powers particularly EU 
have largely favoured PRC’s involvement in world trade and took a less 
confrontational approach with PRC after heavy negotiations for PRC’s reform as 
entry conditions into the WTO (Oksenberg and Economy, 1999, p21; European 
Parliament, 2011, p26). However, this only led to the opposite outcome contrary to 
the prediction. PRC perceived the accession to WTO in 2001 as the end of the reforms 
and not the beginning of its democratisation as PRC was under no further political or 
economical pressure from the liberal hegemonic power to undertake further reforms 
thereafter (Fox and Godement, 2009, p11).  
Since the signing of the Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership agreement in 2003, 
EU’s policy in engaging PRC has been characterised as ‘unconditional’, in the belief 
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that deeper integration of PRC would be sufficient to liberalise the government 
(Cabestan, 2011, p82; Fox and Godement, 2009, p1). It’s a strategy that overlooks 
PRC’s potential strength and ambition by offering much and demanding for little in 
return (Ibid.). Despite EU’s attempts to review the strategy when PRC’s liberal 
reforms lacked progress, conflict of interest amongst member states impeded EU to 
take a more unified and substantial approach in this matter (Cabestan, 2011,p82). 
Economic interest therefore took precedence over liberal ideologies in the 2000’s 
(Maher, 2016, p6), and even France under Chirac’s administration and Germany 
under Schröder were categorised as ‘Accommodating Mercantilist’ in Fox’s report, 
taking a more accommodating stance vis-à-vis PRC to favour trade (see below) 
(2009). The strategy has therefore largely helped the rise of an authoritarian PRC into 
becoming a greater influence on the existing global order.  
Since the financial crisis in 2008 that affected much of Europe, PRC finds itself in a 
better bargaining position than before (Ibid.). In the words of a Chinese scholar, PRC 
no longer “fears” EU because it’s politically divided and EU now needs China more 
than the other way round (Maher, 2016, p17). The view is agreed by other occidental 
academics that EU is not perceived as a strategic geopolitical competitor by PRC 
(unlike USA) but rather as an economic giant with advanced technologies, from 
which PRC can greatly benefit from for the development of their national economy 
and industry (Wacker, 2015, p3; p5; Fox and Godement, 2009, p33; Kundnani and 
Parello-Plesner, 2012, p7; Schnellbach and Man, 2015, p6).  
Indeed PRC has secured substantial technology transfer from EU through their policy. 
For example, European GSM producers must renounce their patent rights in PRC in 
order to enter the market (Ibid.). PRC ‘helped’ and invested in many troubled 
cash-strapped EU firms impacted by the financial crisis, through which PRC also 
acquired their technology (Ibid., Godement, Parello-Plesner and Richard, 2011, p1). 
Yet, as pointed out by the same scholars and Schnellbach and Man, the reverse 
process has been made difficult by PRC as the bureaucratic obstacles, lack of 
transparency and protectionism are few of the major problems EU firms face in order 
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to enter the PRC market (2015, p5). While PRC can indeed implement protectionist 
policies to protect strategic sectors according to the WTO terms, the definition for 
“strategic sectors” is unclear and it can be extended to any industry including 
kitchenware (Fox and Godement, 2009, p46). It’s for this reason that Godement, 
Parello-Plesner and Richard called some EU member states ‘Frustrated 
Market-Opener’ since the EU market is highly transparent for external investment but 
this is not reciprocated by PRC, which reduces only investment opportunities for the 
EU in the bilateral relationship (see below) (2011).  
As Cabestan stated, the rise of PRC per se is not the problem but rather the emergence 
of an illiberal CPC that doesn’t fully assimilate in the existing global order influenced 
by EU’s liberalism (2011). Previous examples demonstrated the limited degree of free 
market in PRC, not to mention that there are still a large portion of state-owned 
enterprise and state subsidise is a common practise to help them compete in the global 
market, going against the neoliberal principals of minimal state interventionism (Fox 
and Godement, 2009, p20; Godement, Parello-Plesner and Richard, 2011). PRC’s 
economy only accepted limited marketisation deemed beneficial to the country but 
generally still far from a market economy to the same degree as the EU.  
In addition, EU and PRC have different definition for the term human rights. The 
Western view of human rights that dominates the EU has always been seen negatively 
by the CPC because it leads to capitalism, democracy, which undermines the 
legitimacy of communism and its national sovereignty (Majtenyi et al., 2016, p70; 
Men, 2011). However, human rights for PRC refer more to the social and cultural 
rights of the citizens, especially those of the disadvantaged (Kinzelbach, 2015, p22). 
Also owing to its history that a long period of authoritarianism prevailed in China, 
Men argues that people have adapted to it and the culture of collective duties in 
contrast to individual ambition. Foreign invasions and colonisation of Chinese 
territories in the past also add to the cause of higher perceived importance of 
maintaining absolute authority over their sovereignty in PRC even at the cost of 
human rights, which is in conflict to the liberal value in EU where protection of 
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human rights take priority over sovereignty (2011.).  
As a result, the CPC gains legitimacy by bringing stability and cohesion to the society 
through economic growth and right to subsistence even if it must deprive its citizens 
of some human rights like freedom of expression (Men, 2011, p544) This gave rise to 
a predominantly economic primacy government in PRC since the beginning in order 
to achieve legitimacy as well as to catch up to other developed economies.  
Financial Crisis: A Divided EU with Internal Competition 
Since the financial crisis, the unity and economy of the EU have been put to the test. 
The national debt of countries like Greece, Portugal reached alarmingly high level 
that required bailouts to prevent them from defaulting on their debt and destabilising 
the Eurozone. Some scholars have suggested a gloomy outlook ahead for the EU. 
Fergusons states that a rising level of debt could signal the decline of a nation (2010). 
According to Maher, the EU is losing the will for strategic ambition in the world as 
they are too occupied by internal affairs (2016, p4), a view also shared by others that 
incoherent and uncoordinated foreign policies amongst themselves weaken their 
collective capacity to solve global problems and adapt to the changing global political 
landscape (Kappel, 2011; Wacker, 2015; Cao, 2014, p57). A sluggish economic 
growth only further drives disunity within EU. Each member state scrambles to 
stimulate their economy in their own way as there is a general lack of confidence that 
EU could act effectively to protect their individual national interests (Fox and 
Godement, 2009, p30).  
In the face of a rapidly growing economy from the authoritarian state of PRC, it has 
only led to further division within the EU due to conflict of interest. The legitimacy of 
the EU is undermined as EU is unable to represent the collective interest in 
negotiation with PRC. “Brussels is losing importance, we must go back to the capitals, 
who make the decisions, speak to member states, even on trade” said by a Chinese 
analyst in Fox and Godement’s report (2009, p.33). Each member state still maintains 
and values the bilateral relation with PRC more than the EU-China relations for their 
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individual national interest, a situation also preferred by PRC to avoid dealing with 
the combined weight of EU as an economic giant (Maher, 2016, p18;Wacker, 2015, 
p7; Fox and Godement , 2009, p37). 
Given the varied economic performance and global status of EU’s member state, it’s 
natural to expect great differences in their attitude towards PRC. Based on their 
attitude, Fox and Godement have divided the 27 EU member states into four 
categories of conflicting interest (before Croatia’s accession in 2013), of which the 
Assertive Industrialists and the Accommodating Mercantilists are the most conflicting. 
The former supports tougher measures against PRC for political and economic issues, 
while the latter is compared to proxies of PRC within EU, favouring trade and 
friendly ties (2009). Godement, Parello-Plesner and Richard built on the report to 
come up with two new categories: Frustrated Market-openers who want to pressure 
PRC for market access reciprocity; Cash-strapped Deal-seekers who are the heavily 
indebted nations in urgent need for Chinese investment but less concern about market 
reciprocity as their industries can’t compete in the PRC market anyway (2011, p7).  
These categories highlight disunity in EU. Fox and Godement argue that the internal 
competitiveness and division were fuelled intentionally by PRC’s carrot-and-stick 
strategy to foster China-friendly policies by member states in exchange for economic 
benefits (2009, p35). Godement, Parello-Plesner and Richard agree also in that PRC 
encourages “race to the bottom” within EU, “play off member against each other and 
against their own collective interests” so they have less leverage to drive a better 
bargain against PRC (2011, p1). This is shown by the substantial growth of trade 
partnership between PRC and the Central and East Europe countries (CEE) whose 
economies were previously heavily reliant on Western Europe, their new trade 
partnership with PRC granted them a new found independence in EU against the 
economically stronger member states (Ibid.; Stanzel et al., 2016).  
For instance, when the former Premier of PRC, Wen Jiabao, visited Budapest to 
announce a line of credit worth 1 billion euro for Hungary, the Hungarian Prime 
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Minister, Viktor Orban, banned a pro-Tibetan demonstration, made no mention of 
human rights and also adopted a clearly more PRC friendly approach compared to 
2000 (Ibid.; Godement, Parello-Plesner and Richard, 2011, p9). The major cause for 
this change of attitude can be traced back to a post-crisis weakened EU economy that 
needs capitals from an economically stronger PRC.  
Appeasement Lobby, those who believe that a more critical stance on PRC’s human 
rights is meaningless for national interest, is arguably expanding (Cabestan, 2011, 87). 
Though it often consists mostly of “Electronic Herds”, we may find state leaders also 
increasingly sharing this view as economic stagnation continues in EU. Such is the 
case that I hope to investigate here. As EU member states each seeks to stimulate 
economic growth in this economic primacy world, to what extent are human right 
concerns taking less priority in the agenda as EU has diminishing leverage and global 
influence in the negotiation with the authoritarian PRC? 
EU-PRC Human Rights Dialogue 
Initiated in 1995, the Human Rights Dialogue between EU and PRC had been taking 
place biannually behind closed doors as a means for officials to facilitate exchanges of 
opinions on human rights issues. This was until PRC reduced it to an annual event 
from 2010 onwards, reflecting a lessened significance of the diplomacy for the CPC 
(Schnellbach and Man, 2015, p17; Kinzelbach, 2015, p187). The quiet diplomacy 
reveals minimum details of the process of the dialogue, it was only in 2014 when the 
first press conference was held to allow for questions from the media and so its 
achievement remain largely unknown and immeasurable (Majtenyi et al., 2016, p8). 
Despite EU’s adoption of a landmark human rights package in 2012 to reaffirm the 
member states’ commitment to human rights internally and externally, little changes 
in their PRC human rights engagement policy can be seen and much doubt over the 
effectiveness of the dialogue has also been raised within the EU (McMillan-Scott, 
2013). Fox and Godement claim that PRC is pragmatic and skilful in accepting the 
dialogue and turning it “into inconclusive talking shops”, a view shared by other 
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scholars, as it prevents EU from making public criticism against their domestic affairs 
and thus maintaining their international image (2009, p8; Cabestan, 2011, p83; Men, 
2011, p546; Kinzelbach, 2015, p195). The lack of progress of the dialogue over the 
past years has even led to little expectation from EU officials for it to yield any 
progress on the human rights matter (Ibid.). Once again, the lack of will for EU to 
take a unified approach against PRC has been blamed here as PRC is able to be 
consistent and determined in downplaying an incoherent EU (Ibid., HRW, 2015) 
Nowadays, PRC’s human rights abuses remain evident, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is still not ratified after the signing in 1998 and EU 
is powerless in this situation ( HRW, 2015). Especially in the face of the financial 
crisis in Europe and a more assertive PRC with growing international weight, EU’s 
leverage in the negotiation is dwindling, to the point where PRC is “no longer willing 
to be lectured on human rights and democracy because ‘times have changed’” as 
allegedly said by an official from PRC (Chen and Kinzelbach, 2015, p403). In 
addition, EU itself is also suffering a human rights crisis which damages their 
legitimacy in preaching this matter to foreign powers; racial discrimination, hate 
speech, social inequality and poverty as a result of the financial crisis are some 
persisting problems that threaten liberalism in Europe to date (Majtenyi et al., 2016, 
p68).  
EU’s rhetoric against PRC’s in terms of human rights is therefore less persuasive and 
convincing now than ever. Its importance in the bilateral relation also seems to 
diminish as the words “human rights” has merely been mentioned twice in a small 
clause of the EU-China Strategic Agenda 2020 in contrast to a much larger section 
dedicated to a closer trade and cooperation partnership in various aspects and sectors 
(EEAS). It seems that the EU fears to enter economic decline especially after the 
financial crisis and thus prioritise economic growth through further integration in the 
world economy even though it is increasingly dominated by the authoritarian PRC. 
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Sino – French Relations 
As one of the first nations in the world to make an official declaration to protect 
human rights in 1789, France is known to be a key proponent on this matter and the 
place where European liberalism first originated. With significant post-colonial 
influence in Africa, the largest military personnel in Europe and an influential position 
in the UNSC, G7 and G20, France wields considerable global influence and considers 
itself a ‘small major power’ with special status in world politics (Cao, 2014, p55; 
Huotari et al., 2015, p27). This is reflected on their past preference to pursue an 
independent foreign policy within EU, including that of being the first to establish 
diplomatic ties with PRC in 1964, facilitating a change of policy in the west 
concerning the Taiwan Strait territorial dispute (Cabestan, 2006, p327).  
Nevertheless, just like the EU, France’s stance on human rights is occasionally 
contradicting throughout history, especially during the colonial period. France may 
have played an active role in EU’s arms embargo to PRC after the deadly incident at 
Tiananmen in 1989 but France was also the first European country to resume 
diplomatic ties again with Beijing in 1991. Paris even adapted the One-China policy 
after Beijing retaliated on the bilateral trade when France sold arms to Taiwan 
following the event, drawing criticism that France succumbed to the pressure of an 
authoritarian power and turned their back on a new fragile democratic state (Cabestan, 
2006, p327 - 333). Since then, both countries have steadily strengthened their 
diplomatic and trade relation, some say it’s strategic in hopes of forging a more 
multipolar world order not dominated by the USA and gain more autonomy in its 
foreign policy (Cao, 2014, p57; Cabestan, 2006, p331). 
France as a founding EU member state has been influential in EU’s China policy in 
the past (Ibid.) but this relation has been complicated in recent years by other 
externalities and particularly a more powerful Germany. France under Chirac’s 
administration was behind the further integration of EU, believing that the collective 
weight can help France achieve its global ambition as well as defend its national 
interest like on trade (Cao, 2014; Godement 2015). However, some have pointed out 
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the competitive and also at times conflicting nature in this relationship. For example, 
as the fourth largest arms exporter of the world, France has been advocating for EU to 
end the arms embargo with PRC, arguing that PRC has made significant 
improvements since the Tiananmen incident. It caused a division within the EU as 
many in EU are not convinced of the argument and remain preoccupied by PRC’s 
ongoing human rights violations (Maher, 2016, p7; Men, 2011; Cabestan, 2006, 
p330).  
Furthermore, France has consistently exported significantly less to PRC than 
Germany (Cabestan, 2006, p335; Sachwald, 2016, p253). Having benefitted less from 
the growth of China, the French independent foreign policy is seen to be competing 
against both the technologically advanced North and the indebted South within EU for 
export and investment advantages (Ibid.; Godement, 2015; Huotari et al., 2015, p26). 
Duchatel gave the most notable example. When Sino-German relation was on a 
temporary brake as the new Merkel administration in Germany took a more critical 
tone towards the human rights issues in PRC and met with the Dalai Lama in 2007, 
Sarkozy did not share the same approach and instead signed 20 billion Euros worth of 
trade deal with Beijing while Germany was out of the picture. This played to the 
advantage of PRC as they secured technology transfer from France instead when 
relations with Germany was uncertain (2007).  
Sarkozy did also try to challenge PRC on the subject of human rights afterwards in 
2008, notably through threats to boycott the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and 
meeting the Dalai Lama. However, adverse impacts on the French economic interest 
became apparent after the CPC retaliated through boycotts of Carrefour in PRC, 
alleged cancellation of airbus orders and meetings with PRC’s trade delegation (Fox 
and Godement, 2009, p35; Cao, 2014, p55; Fuchs and Klan, 2010). In the end, the 
official declaration in 2009 to recognise Tibet as part of PRC’s territory was what 
helped Sarkozy mend the diplomatic ties as France received PRC’s trade delegation 
shortly afterwards (Ibid.; Cao, 2014).  
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According to Huotari et al., this signaled a return to pragmatism for France’s China 
policy, which continued throughout Hollande’s administration (2015, p26). 
Nevertheless, this is not new from France as past events such as the recognition of the 
One-China policy in the 1990’s also suggested similar tendency to win back Beijing’s 
favour. It shows that France in the end often prioritises economic interest over 
ideational principles and in fact, the new buzzword ‘economic diplomacy’ is now 
used by senior officials to describe its foreign policy, seeking out growth wherever it 
may be even if that’s in the authoritarian PRC (Godement, 2015). According to 
Duchatel, France needs to secure Chinese capitals and trade deals to have the backing 
from French companies for the government, which is supported by the fact that 
France is now the largest market in the Eurozone for trade in the Chinese currency 
(Ibid.; Duchatel, 2007). The financial crisis of 2008 only put France in an even more 
vulnerable position against PRC with scholars claiming that France has now become a 
middle power struggling for economic growth (Godement, 2015; Huotari et al., 2015, 
p27).  
Discourse Analysis of French president 
The analysis period of 2010-2016 saw the change of presidents from centre-right 
Nicolas Sarkozy to centre-left François Hollande, though there were no significant 
changes in their China policy as both the left and right in France see PRC as an 
important partner (Cabestan, 2006). This is most noticeable as both presidents 
frequently reminded the audience of the historical tie that both countries share since 
General de Gaulle as the “pioneer” of the occidental world that first established 
diplomatic ties with PRC (Sarkozy, 2010b). The Sino-French relation has been 
described as a ‘friendship’ that is “old”, “profound”, “solid” as the introduction or the 
ending of the speech on many occasions (Sarkozy, 2010d; Hollande, 2013d). 
PRC’s capability 
In terms of PRC’s capabilities, it was no surprise that its economic aspect was 
extensively mentioned with 65.21%, nevertheless its transformative power was 
mentioned with even higher frequency of 69.56%. Most rhetoric concerning its 
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economic power is straightforward with frequent reminder of PRC having the second 
strongest economy in the world with rapid GPD growth rate. In more specific case, 
Hollande talked of PRC’s monetary power that has substantial capacity as a creditor 
for the occidental world as well as an increasingly internationalised currency 
(Hollande, 2014d), or pointing out that PRC’s strong domestic demand that will make 
its economy more robust than others (Hollande, 2015a).  
It serves as an acknowledgement of PRC’s economic strength and in particularly, it 
has been portrayed as “an opportunity of development” for France’s economy that 
would help stimulate its growth again (Hollande, 2015c). “Europe needs China for 
growth”, Hollande’s statement paints a TINA (There Is No Alternative) impression on 
the importance of PRC to reinvigorate the EU’s stagnant economy (2013c). 
Furthermore, its economic might has always been discussed positively in relation to 
job creation in France. Chinese investments in France and better innovation, market 
penetration by French firms in PRC are both essential to improve employment at 
home vis-à-vis PRC, protectionism is not a viable option for keeping jobs in France 
(Hollande, 2015b; Hollande, 2013a; Sarkozy, 2011). This rhetoric paves for the 
economic primacy foreign policy approach that will be discussed later. 
Power Category Number of Text Where Mentioned Percentage 
Transformative 16 69.56% 
Economic 15 65.21% 
Military 2 8.69% 
Ideational 0 0% 
Figure 2. Categories of PRC’s capabilities found in French discourses 
 
The transformative category denotes the ability and potential in which PRC can exert 
global influence on global affairs and development including through its economic 
power. For example, both Sarkozy and Hollande have mentioned the important role of 
PRC in stabilising global economy, particularly in the face of the Eurozone crisis 
(Sarkozy, 2010a; Hollande, 2013b). The Chinese effort to help set global monetary or 
economic regulations is also welcomed by Hollande, given the increasing significance 
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of their national currency in world trade (Hollande, 2013a). In fact, both presidents 
have mentioned that Asia, with the most dynamic economy at the moment, has 
become the new “centre of the world where the future of the world takes shape” and 
that France must be present there or it risks becoming a country “with a shining past 
but not now anymore” (Hollande, 2013d; Sarkozy, 2010c). This rhetoric coincides 
with the idea of economic primacy and validates the ‘economic diplomacy’ approach 
mentioned before by the senior French officials.  
PRC’s transformative power has also been mentioned in reference to its involvement 
in tackling key global issues and in international institutions such as G20 and UNSC 
has been highly valued in the speech of both presidents. “We won’t find solutions 
without the Chinese contribution”, this TINA rhetoric portrays PRC as indispensable 
for the development of global affairs (Sarkozy, 2010d). In the run-up to the Paris 
climate change conference, Hollande also repeatedly stressed the importance of PRC 
supportive effort in order to reach an agreement, especially because “PRC also has a 
great influence on [other] developing countries”, suggesting that PRC is an essential 
channel to get through to the less developed countries (2015a). This has strategic 
significance for France as PRC is heavily involved in the development and investment 
in Africa, where France has much post-colonial ties. PRC’s growing activity there 
could challenge France’s sphere of influence unless Paris could align Beijing’s 
interest with their own. 
Interestingly, despite being the second country with the largest military expenditure 
after the USA, PRC’s military capability has only been mentioned on rare occasions 
and even so, only in positive light. Example includes when Hollande praised PRC for 
their contribution to UN’s peacekeeping force or refer to PRC as a responsible nuclear 
power keen on maintaining world peace (Hollande, 2014a; Hollande, 2014c). The 
presidents perhaps want to create a positive image for PRC at home to justify their 
strengthening partnership as military capability is deemed more threatening. It also 
confirms the view that the EU and PRC have little geopolitical conflict of interest and 
thus military capability is irrelevant in this relation. Furthermore, PRC’s ideational 
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power has also not been mentioned. 
Foreign policy for PRC 
In line with the findings on how France depicted PRC’s capabilities, cooperation on 
trade along with global political governance are the most frequently mentioned, with 
both being mentioned 86.96% of the time. Specifically for economic ties, the 
Sino-French cooperation has been branded as “a priority of [our] foreign policy” by 
Sarkozy, portraying it as the single most important trade relationship for France 
(Sarkozy, 2010a). The benefits of the economic cooperation with PRC for France 
have been repeatedly mentioned and not once the adverse impacts, notably the large 
profitable Chinese market that the French firms can gain from and how it will help 
improve labour market in France. Thus both presidents have urged for the need to 
improve market presence of French products in PRC by greater investment from 
France or by greater reciprocity on market access from PRC with 52.17% of mentions. 
This has been mentioned often in the context of the 26 billion Euros trade deficit 
vis-à-vis PRC, both presidents mentioned the necessity to strengthen France’s 
capacity to penetrate the Chinese market instead of resorting to protectionism in order 
to balance the trade deficit from above.  
Nature of Foreign Policy with PRC Number of Text Where Mentioned Percentage 
Trade/ Economic Cooperation 20 86.96% 
- Greater Market Presence in PRC 12 52.17% 
- Mutual Benefits 5 21.74% 
Political/ Global Governance 
Intellectual Exchange 
Ideational Similarity 
Address Human Rights 
20 
14 
7 
2 
86.96% 
60.87% 
30.43% 
8.70% 
Figure 3. Nature of French foreign policy vis-à-vis PRC 
At the same time, Paris recognises that PRC ultimately has the authority in granting 
access to French companies and thus urges Beijing to pursue greater reciprocity in 
their trade policy, notably with Sarkozy asking for the rights for French companies to 
be a major stock holder in PRC in exchange for the recognition of their market 
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economy status (Sarkozy, 2010c). Hollande refrained from making similar proposal 
and just wished for Chinese effort to favour the growth of domestic demands and 
reduce import restriction (2013e).  
“I affirm here: All obstacles, all brakes, all the procedures will be removed because 
we want to attract…capitals [and]…Chinese investments for employment, creation of 
trade” (Hollande, 2013b). Though Hollande has stressed that only investments that 
create jobs in France will be fully welcomed without any restrictions, this unilateral 
declaration reflects a power imbalance vis-à-vis PRC because the Chinese market is 
still reasonably protected by trade restrictions despite Hollande’s continuous appeal 
(2015a). The fact that Paris is willing to make such unilateral promise shows its 
eagerness to attract Chinese capitals, an eagerness that is clearly not shared to the 
same extent by Beijing and thus maintain its comparatively higher trade barriers 
against France.  
From the perspective of competitive state, it can also be seen as France striving for 
better attractiveness for Chinese investment relative to other European countries by 
removing its trade barriers to PRC. Hollande specifically commented on the problem 
of France’s competiveness, saying that “we are more expensive in certain sectors than 
our key competitors. This isn’t acceptable.”(2015b). He went on to praise the 
successful effort to lower the French labour cost again to “the same level or even 
lower than our German friends”, implying implicitly the competition against Germany 
in this area (Ibid.). This rhetoric from Hollande also supports the golden straitjacket 
theory that democratic policy cannot co-exist with globalisation as France has to 
compromise the income level and economic welfare of the French nation in order to 
appeal to the Electronic Herd for capitals, which are the Chinese investors in this case. 
The mutual interdependence and benefits such as the ‘win-win’ rhetoric have also 
been mentioned with 21.74% of the time, “Europe needs China for growth and 
Europe needs Europe for development of their technology” (Hollande, 2013e), 
nevertheless, the dependence and benefits could well be unbalanced too just like the 
30 
 
power dynamic in trade restrictions, most likely favouring PRC. The debate on 
technology transfer throughout the 6 years also reveals similar finding on France’s 
leverage against PRC in the negotiation. Sarkozy notably disagreed with a forced 
transfer of technology back in 2010 from French companies to PRC, contrary to 
Hollande who often talks of technological cooperation instead and also welcomed 
technology transfer from PRC on digital technology to France in 2015 (2015b). Not 
only did this reveal a rapid technological progress from PRC but also an indication of 
changing attitude from France from minor disagreement to full cooperation as PRC 
becomes increasingly advanced. 
Apart from the economic cooperation, other aspects have also been commented on. 
The strategic partnership on global governance has been mentioned extensively, 
notably on how both countries have permanent seats at the UNSC and how a joint 
effort could from these two big nations can ensure better financial stability, peace and 
even to “conquer the world” together (Ibid). “We do not only have economic 
ambitions, we also want to increase the [intellectual] exchange between our two 
companies”, referring to exchange of culture and research (2014b). Intellectual 
exchange also has 60.87% of mentions, specifically on the exchange of students 
between the two countries, language learning and scientific research in nuclear energy 
and aviation etc. The visa procedure for Chinese tourists to France has been shortened 
to just 48 hours. However, they are both arguably done out of economic interest to 
further improve the future business exchange as well as boosting revenue generated 
from tourism.  
In line with the prediction, the necessity to address human rights and liberal values in 
PRC has hardly been mentioned with just 8.70% of the time. Hollande only 
mentioned it on his first visit to Beijing and he basically shared Sarkozy’s approach 
thereafter in merely stating that they have different values despite their strong ties. 
However, there were no more mentions thereafter, reflecting perhaps the greater need 
of France to secure Chinese investments and capitals. Surprisingly, Hollande also 
increasingly talked of their ideational bond over the principles of independence and 
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sovereignty (2014d), perhaps in hopes of gaining Chinese support on the issue of 
Ukraine but in doing so, also justified the Chinese authority to undertake any possibly 
totalitarian action within their own territory regarding their political dissidents or the 
sensitive issue of Tibet for example. By remaining silent on human rights concerns, 
France is seen as compromising its liberal values in exchange for Beijing’s favour.  
Sino-German Relations 
Even before the establishment of diplomatic ties and the reunification of the country, 
West Germany was already the largest trade partner of PRC in 1972 (Kundnani and 
Parello-Plesner, 2012, p1). This is because Germany has consistently been one of the 
top exporters of the world. With the strongest economy in EU, it has earned the 
reputation as Europe’s economic powerhouse (Wacker, 2015). In fact, many scholars 
indicated Berlin’s economic reliance on foreign demand on statistics; the export sector 
employs one third of the German workforce, is responsible for around 50% of its total 
GDP and also account for 50% of all EU export to PRC (Ibid; Schnellbach and Man, 
2015, p2; Kundnani, 2015). The similarity of the German and Chinese growth model 
has led many to call Germany ‘the little China’ because both economies rely on 
export-led growth with an undervalued currency and weak wage growth to favour 
trade surplus (Ibid.; Stark, 2010, p528). 
For this reason, economic interest has dominated the bilateral relations especially 
since Schroeder’s chancellery. Kundnani and Parello-Plesner talked of the costly 
German reunification as a reason to prioritise economic goals instead of political 
objectives (2012). In fact, the overwhelming economic focus of Schroeder’s foreign 
policy led some to call it the checkbook diplomacy (Scheckbuchdiplomatie), 
achieving goals through economic means (Schnellbach and Man, 2015, p2). In 
particularly, Schroeder’s China policy has been described as ‘Change through Trade’ 
(Wandel durch Handel) and ‘Change through Rapprochement’ (Wandel durch 
Annaeherung), the idea to facilitate societal and political change in PRC through 
stronger trade and inclusion into the community of responsibility 
(Verantwortungsgemeinschaft) (Ibid; Kundnani and Parello-Plesner, 2012; Huotari, 
32 
 
2015, p31). Together with a China friendly Chirac in France, this has arguably 
influenced EU’s overall China policy to be, which has being described earlier in this 
paper as, ‘unconditional’, offering much and asking for little in return.  
When Merkel became Chancellor in 2005, she was critical of Schroeder’s 
accommodating approach and her China policy was considered more value-based 
with a heavier focus on human rights (Heiduk, 2014, p118; Duchatel, 2007; 
Schnellbach and Man, 2015, p8). Notable examples include the meeting with the 
Dalai Lama in 2007, the boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games over the incident in 
Tibet in 2008 and also a firmer approach in the arms embargo debate (Ibid,; Cabestan, 
2006). A publication from her party CDU stressed the importance to maintain good 
trade partnership with Asia without any protectionism but at the same time encourage 
stronger social justice and human rights values there in order to have an Asia that 
shares the German/ European interest in the future (CDU, 2007). The strong moral 
conviction is perhaps due to her upbringing in the totalitarian East Germany and the 
fact that his father is a pastor (Schnellbach and Man, 2015; Kundnani and 
Parello-Plesner, 2012). Nevertheless, CDU still perceives PRC as an important trade 
partner for Germany, calling Asia the “most dynamic region” and an “opportunity” for 
Germany and Europe (2007), and Merkel also did not visit PRC any less than 
Schroeder did (Schnellbach and Man, 2015).  
Nonetheless, Merkel’s more critical approach for PRC was challenged by the financial 
crisis in 2008, which brought economic growth and financial stability back as the 
priority for her government. While demands from Europe and USA have fallen due to 
the crisis, PRC emerged to be a stable demand for German goods, thus bringing a 
power shift directly to the Sino-German relation when Berlin became more dependent 
on Chinese capitals and investments (Ibid.; Kundnani and Parello-Plesner, 2012). In 
fact, PRC is said to be the principle reason that Germany made a quick recovery 
following the financial crisis in 2008, thus Merkel faced pressure from industrial 
lobbyist to maintain good ties with PRC and return to a more accommodating 
approach. Since 2011, Germany and PRC have been holding annual joint cabinet 
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meeting under Berlin’s initiative, the first meeting of this kind agreed by PRC, 
demonstrating the significance each side attach to this bilateral relation (Ibid.; 
Kundnani, 2015; Wacker, 2015). 
Merkel’s effort has paid off as PRC officially became the most important trading 
partner of Germany in 2016, overtaking France and the USA. Yet, the increasing 
dependence on PRC for economic growth certainly comes with consequences for 
Germany. Berlin is now more vulnerable to an economic slowdown in PRC. It has 
reduced leverage in promoting human rights (Heiduk, 2014, p120) and also threatened 
by potential technology drainage whereby involuntary technology transfer enables 
PRC to gradually catch-up technologically and emerge as a competition in the 
technological sector (Huotari, 2015, p33; Kundnani and Parello-Plesner, 2012). For 
example, the German firm Q-Cells was once the largest manufacturer of solar cells 
but it ultimately collapsed due to Chinese competition (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, the increasing competitions from PRC often become also a cause for 
conflict between Germany and the EU. Nowadays, Berlin is already said to be 
increasingly replacing Brussels as the partner for trade dialogue in the EU due to the 
strong economic power and its influence within the EU. The first trip made by the 
Chinese Prime minister in 2012, Li Keqiang, only visited Berlin and even a Chinese 
official has said “If you want something done in Brussels, you go to Berlin” (Ibid.; 
Kundnani, 2015; Pop, 2013). When EU tried to take anti-dumping measures to protect 
European firms against Chinese solar panel competition, it was met with Berlin’s 
strong opposition on ground of not wanting to start a trade-war with PRC. Though it 
was widely seen as a move that weakened EU’s position vis-à-vis PRC, it also raised 
the question on Germany’s commitment to the Western alliance (Ibid.; Wacke, 2014; 
Kundnani, 2015; Schnellbach and Man, 2015). Skeptical scholars talk of it as 
Beijing’s strategic goal to forge a more economically powerful but more dependent 
Germany on Chinese market so that Germany can “upload” its China friendly policy 
to EU level (Ibid.; Kundnani and Parello-Plesner, 2012). 
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Discourse Analysis of the German Chancellor  
The Sino-German relation celebrated their 40
th
 anniversary during the analysed period. 
While the length of the diplomatic relation was not used extensively as a sign of 
strength of the bilateral tie like France did, Merkel did express on numerous occasions, 
how impressive and unexpected it is for the two countries to have such close working 
relationship nowadays, with “70 Forums and Dialog Formats” where they can openly 
discuss any problems, indicating the close and important ties they share (2014b; 
2016e). Though at times with a somewhat more critical tone than France (see below), 
Merkel has generally kept a positive discourse with PRC. 
PRC Capabilities 
Akin to France, mentions of PRC’s economic and transformative powers are most 
common by Merkel, each with 52.17% and 56.52% of mentions respectively. She 
described the country’s development as ‘dynamic’ and also how important PRC is as 
Germany and EU’s major trading partner (2011). At the same time, its transformative 
power is associated with its growing economic power. Merkel once said, ‘it is a 
logical consequence for us that China becomes more globally constructive with its 
rising economic strength’ (2016b), welcoming its increased global responsibility. In 
general, Merkel has also praised PRC for its contribution to the peacekeeping and 
development of Africa as well as the cooperation in helping to achieve the Paris 
Climate deal, sharing the TINA belief of France that “not a single global problem can 
be solved without China and its involvement anymore” (2014b). Merkel has equally 
thanked Beijing for being a “reliable partner” during the difficult time of the Euro 
crisis, claiming that the Eurozone would have a different destiny if it weren’t for the 
Chinese support (2015a). 
Power Category Number of Text Where Mentioned Percentage 
Transformative 13 56.52% 
Economic 12 52.17% 
Military 0 0% 
Ideational 0 0% 
Figure 4. Categories of PRC’s capabilities found in German discourses 
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Different to the French discourse, Merkel is notably more specific and verbal in 
naming global issues where she expects Beijing to exert a greater diplomatic influence. 
Apart from the issue of Iran’s nuclear problem that Paris has also commented on, she 
also expressed hope to have the Chinese contribution in solving the tension of the 
Korean Peninsula and the insurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2014a). 
Unlike France who has simply talked of their alignment with Beijing’s principle of 
territorial integrity as an ideational bond in the official speeches, Merkel used the 
principle specifically to voice hopes to gain Chinese support for Ukraine’s 
sovereignty.  
Specifically, this was mentioned in one of her considerably more critical speech as she 
addressed a German think tank in Beijing and not accompanied by a Chinese official, 
in which she even questioned the nature of President Xi’s visit at Maldives, it was a 
proof of her more vocal nature in expressing her own thoughts publicly. In the same 
speech, she also admitted that PRC is more strategic than the EU with better ability to 
think ahead of their interest, indicating the potential of the Chinese transformative 
power on shaping the world to come (2015a). Nonetheless, perhaps for similar 
reasons to France, the Chinese military capability has not been mentioned except in 
the context of their contribution to UN peacekeeping missions. Ideational power also 
scored zero mentions 
Foreign policy for PRC 
In line with the findings for France, economic cooperation and global political 
governance are most widely mentioned in Merkel’s public communication, both with 
82.61%. The economic cooperation between Germany and PRC has been consistently 
hailed as “of utmost importance” or with other similar wordings (2010). Just as 
Hollande did, Merkel spoke of many opportunities to further broaden the economic 
exchange, notably through joint investments to enter economies of third states, 
urbanisation in PRC, Electro-mobility and membership at the AIIB etc.(2016d; 2014b; 
2015b). This topic has always been spoken of positively, “Of course I have trust in 
China’s economic development”, and Merkel often condemned protectionist measures 
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(Ibid). Even in the case of the anti-dumping dispute between EU and PRC, Merkel has 
insisted that further dialogues will suffice to solve the issue and never resort to trade 
war (2012b). 
In particular, she consistently reaffirmed the openness of German market to welcome 
Chinese investment and at the same time expressed wish for a greater reciprocity from 
the Chinese side, with 39.13% mentions. “Equality of treatment”, “fair competition” 
and “freer access” are the keywords used to achieve better conditions for German 
companies in PRC (2011). The subject of legal certainty in relation to patent, property 
rights and data protection has also been mentioned in connection to the reciprocity 
topic, thus indicating that Germany is also in an unfavourable situation just like 
France on trade vis-à-vis PRC, with fewer rights, less leverage for any negotiation and 
hopes to open the Chinese market(2016b). Even though German investments face 
more restrictions in PRC than vice-versa, Merkel spoke of mutual benefits in 34.78% 
of the time nonetheless, namely using the ‘win-win’ rhetoric, to encourage confidence 
and further investment from both sides. 
Nature of Foreign Policy with PRC Number of Text Where Mentioned Percentage 
Trade/ Economic Cooperation 19 82.61% 
- Greater Market Presence in PRC 9 39.13% 
- Mutual Benefits 8 34.78% 
Political/ Global Governance 
Intellectual Exchange 
Ideational Similarity 
Address Human Rights 
19 
15 
1 
13 
82.61% 
65.21% 
4.34% 
56.52% 
Figure 5. Nature of German foreign policy vis-à-vis PRC 
Merkel attributes the mutual success of the two countries in trade as well as global 
governance on the increasing dialogue and the exchange of opinion taking place 
between them, “the more mutual trust grows in our relationship, the more transparent 
things are, the more equal opportunities German firms will have in PRC…” (2016d). 
This increased dialogue also led to the establishment of a strong strategic partnership 
on global level, in areas such as the international financial system; global security and 
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reconstruction in conflicted countries; environmental protection and also cyber 
security.  
Outside of the governmental level, cultural and intellectual exchange between citizens 
has also been widely promoted in her speech just like the French presidents did, with 
65.21% mentions and examples such as the Chinese Culture Year and growing 
exchange of students to improve mutual understanding between the two nations. In 
addition, Merkel also praised Chinese firms for “having developed impressive 
technological competence in many areas and thus making them desirable partners for 
German firms in R&D” (2011). That serves as an acknowledgement of PRC’s 
increasing technological ability to compete internationally, which is portrayed very 
positively for German economy. 
Until now, we see an overall very positive image of the partnership with PRC through 
Merkel’s discourse and contrary to France, she was able to maintain her consistency 
in speaking out about human rights. Much of the 56.52% mentions of human rights in 
her public communication allude to the importance of their annual human rights 
dialogue where the discussion aims improve human rights in both countries. Without 
being critical, she found ways to bring up the subject in a more cordial manner while 
telling the audience that the subject still matters a great deal to her in several 
occasions, “human rights always play a role in my speeches” (2012a). In this same 
speech when she spoke of human rights in PRC, she subsequently also showed 
understanding towards PRC that they “have to handle huge issues to ensure the 
welfare of the nation” (Ibid). Another example is when she spoke of the need for 
reforms for a freer expression of opinion, creativity and culture, she referred not only 
to “a society like the Chinese but also the German [society]” (2014a). The rhetoric of 
talking of human rights for both countries and the human rights dialogue as an 
exchange of opinion places significantly less limelight on PRC as the ‘bad guy’, 
which is certainly more accepted by the CPC.  
It is interesting that the human rights discussed are all rather political that can 
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potentially influence the public opinion, but not much on social matters such as labour 
conditions, death penalty or rights of minorities such as Tibetans. Throughout this 
period of analysis, the human rights issues raised are primarily concerning the 
freedom of the press, information in relation to internet censorship, expression and the 
operation of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs). In a more unusual speech 
addressing students of the Tsinghua University, she advocated for democracy and 
social market economy with careful wordings, claiming that by providing property 
rights, educational rights and having a pluralist society, it formed the foundation that 
led to the success of Germany today (2014b). While it can be argued that human 
rights is such a broad topic that Merkel only targeted few of the main issues, in a 
skeptical view, she can be considered as strategic in speaking out only on issues that 
would favour liberalism development in PRC and thus the German stance in the 
global order but not issues that might raise the labour cost of their imports or sensitive 
issues that will clearly upset Beijing.  
Nonetheless, comparing to her more confrontational approach before the financial 
crisis, it remains evident that her more cautious approach now to handle the subject is 
due to the growing leverage that PRC has gained as a powerful economic actor with 
strategic importance in contrast to a troubled Eurozone with stagnant growth. 
Merkel’s promise to her constituency and her personal conviction may bring her to 
continue her dialogues on the subject but it remains unclear whether it has any real 
impact. When asked whether Beijing would take her human rights concerns seriously, 
Merkel answered in response, “at least we have talked intensively about it” (2016c). 
She has timelessly stressed the importance of the dialogues but are they ultimately 
just ‘inconclusive talking shops’ that Fox claimed them to be?  
The Future of Liberalism 
Overall, the findings indicate that states leaders also share Streeck’s idea that 
economic power has now become the new political power. The fact that both nature of 
power and cooperation are most frequently mentioned and also consistently coupled 
together is the proof. Even if EU is not dependent on PRC for economic growth, an 
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amicable relationship is still fundamental in pursing global interest in the global 
governance area. In the face of stagnant growth and a more accommodating approach 
from France, Germany alone lacked the leverage to make any real progress on the 
matter despite the best intention. Even though Merkel did not cease to mention the 
human rights issues as finding shows, it’s hard to see that her soft-line approach can 
bring changes to the increasingly assertive Beijing.  
In retrospect, the findings validates Rodrik’s trilemma theory, to the extent that a 
country like France has to put aside its liberal ideology in their discourse and 
Germany must also adapt a less critical approach regardless of the public opinion of 
PRC in the country to facilitate trade with the economic giant. In the perspective of 
competitive state, both countries can be seen as being in a popularity contest to win 
Beijing’s favour by being the ideal partner that doesn’t challenge its authority and its 
image. It raises the question whether economic prosperity is ultimately the only 
means to gain autonomy in a globalised democratic world and to spread ideational 
values. Perhaps just like Merkel said, the EU’s mistake was the failure to think 
strategically for the long-term interest and did not take a more unified approach to 
enforce a stricter golden straitjacket on PRC when it still had the collective economic 
and political power leverage to do so. Instead, it welcomed the cheaper Chinese goods 
produced in poor labour conditions and now it’s maybe too late to preach human 
rights. 
In any case, a new global political dynamic has emerged in the new millennium. 
Marketisation of global economy has brought a strong interdependence between states 
all thriving for economic growth. Facilitated by advanced technology, power dynamic 
between states can now change rapidly due to a financial crisis or a change of 
administration as the constituency’s opinion is also more readily influenced through a 
technological able media. Brexit and the Trump administration in the USA are 
examples where the nations unexpectedly voted to become more inward-looking. The 
liberal West is suffering an internal crisis and Merkel has even said to no longer rely 
on these two longtime allies anymore (McGee and Parker, 2017).  
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This casts significant doubts on the transatlantic alliance, not to mention the crisis of 
liberalism happening right now in Europe and USA due to the refugees and 
islamophobia, undermining the liberal global order that has shaped the global 
development in the last few decades. The rise of a proactive, forward-looking, illiberal 
PRC becoming increasingly an economic hegemony is just another catalyst for the 
change of the global development of ideology, arguably facilitated by the internal 
conflict of the West if Germany, France, Europe already have to turn to Beijing for 
economic growth and maybe even for political support on global governance. What 
was unthinkable few years ago is already reality, with an isolationist USA abandoning 
free trade and climate pledges while PRC’s stance remains aligned with the EU. A 
progressively stronger alliance between EU and PRC certainly leaves us to question 
the future development of human rights and liberalism.. 
Considering the adverse externalities, the foreign policy of EU including Berlin and 
Paris is arguably more pragmatic than ideational vis-à-vis PRC. It leads to a greater 
debate whether ideational influence is only possible as an economic hegemony like 
Europe and USA were before the rise of PRC. Though given the uneven process of 
the liberalisation around the world, it could also be argued that countries like France 
has always been somewhat pragmatic and pursued global ideational development only 
when it favoured its status, national or even personal interest of the presidents. It 
raises another debate whether the EU is really as liberal is it claimed to be.  
So, the future of liberalism remains opaque. While PRC has had remarkable 
development to become the economic giant today, its credit rating has been 
downgraded already over concerns of its mounting debt. No one knows when the rise 
of PRC will stop and what other abrupt changes we could expect from the Trump’s 
administration. Nonetheless, EU should start by tackling the internal crisis if 
liberalism were to have a chance to survive. The current globalisation will only 
exacerbate the ‘descent to barbarism’ in Europe if the wealth inequality continues to 
widen, at which point, liberalism may crumble itself without the impact of any 
externalities. 
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